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ADMISSIBILITY OF "DAY IN THE LIFE" FILMS IN
VIRGINIA
Mahlon G. Funk, Jr.*
Harry J. Hicks, III**
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, audiovisual technology1 has taken an increas-
ingly prominent position in courtroom procedures.2 Defense attor-
neys have traditionally introduced motion pictures of allegedly in-
jured plaintiffs caught in some intense physical activity.3 More
recently, courts have allowed the use of audiovisual depositions,
which afford scrutiny of the characteristics and mannerisms of de-
posed witnesses.4 In the midst of this evidentiary trend, plaintiffs'
* Partner, Hirschler, Fleischer, Weinberg, Cox & Allen, Richmond, Virginia; B.A. 1967,
M.S. 1969, Virginia Polytechnical Institute; M.A. 1971, University of Dayton; J.D. 1975, Col-
lege of William & Mary.
** B.A. 1981, College of William & Mary; J.D. Candidate, 1985, University of Virginia.
The author wishes to thank Harry J. Hicks for his support and inspiration.
1. The term "audiovisual technology" will sometimes be used in this article to refer to a
variety of instruments including sound recordings, photographs, films, and videotapes.
2. See, e.g., Perlman, Seeing is Believing - Making Proof More Meaningful, TRIAL, June
1981, at 34, which provides in pertinent part:
New concepts and techniques are being used with increasing frequency to communi-
cate the language of the suffering, maimed, and injured victims of our society. It is no
longer adequate to present an injury case through testimonial evidence alone. Modern
day technology now makes it possible to present evidence in such a way that all of the
senses of the jury have been touched. It is a trial lawyer's obligation to educate, stim-
ulate, and involve the jury to as great a degree as possible.
Id.
3. These films have universally been held admissible. See Mirabile v. New York Cent.
R.R., 230 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1956); Kortz v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 144 F.2d 676 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 728 (1944); McGoorty v. Benhart, 305 IM. App. 458, 27 N.E.2d 289
(1940); Balian v. General Motors, 121 N.J. Super. 118, 296 A.2d 317 (1972); DeBattiste v.
Anthony Laudadio & Son, 167 Pa. Super. 38, 74 A.2d 784 (1950). See generally Sweet, The
Motion Picture as a Fraud Detector, 21 A.B.A. J. 653 (1935); Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 686, 698
(1958).
4. The utilization of audiovisual depositions has been particularly noteworthy in the situ-
ation where a medical witness will be unavailable at trial. See State v. Moss, 498 S.W.2d 289
(Mo. 1973); Rubino v. G.C. Searle & Co., 73 Misc. 2d 447, 340 N.Y.S.2d 574 (1973); Perlnan,
supra note 2, at 34. The Rubino court provided the rationale supporting the use of audiovi-
sual depositions when it held that "the finder of fact at trial often will gain greater insight
from the manner in which an answer is delivered and recorded by audiovisual devices." 73
Misc. 2d at -, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 576 (quoting 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE & PROCEDURE 426 (1979)).
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counsel now frequently seek admission of "day in the life" films.
Such films purport to depict for the jury in graphic detail the ef-
fects that a severe personal injury can have on the plaintiff's life.5
Admission of these films is held to be within the discretion of the
trial judge.' The recurrent theme of available case law is that "day
in the life" films are not inadmissible as a matter of law,' but
rather admissibility turns upon the circumstances of each case, and
the contents and presentation of each film.8 Successful admission o
of the film presents many theoretical and practical challenges to
the proponent because a wide spectrum of evidentiary concepts
and principles are involved in the admissibility analysis. The ques-
tion of admissibility in Virginia has yet to be addressed by the
state supreme court.'
This article will initially highlight the nature of these films,"°
and outline leading authority supporting their admission.1 Next,
the article will examine the proponent's foundation requirements, 2
and analyze the evidentiary objections that will be raised by de-
5. See generally Begam & Begam, A Day in the Life of a Quadriplegic, TRIAL, Mar. 1978,
at 25; Preiser & Hoffman, Day in the Life Films - Coming of Age in the Courtroom, Part
I, TRIAL, Aug. 1981, at 26.
6. See Reggio v. Louisiana Gas Serv. Co., 333 So. 2d 395, 402 (La. App. 1976); Capara v.
Chrysler Corp., 71 A.D.2d 515, -, 423 N.Y.S.2d 694, 698 (1979), af'd, 52 N.Y.2d 114, 417
N.E.2d 545, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1981); Apache Ready Mix Co. v. Creed, 653 S.W.2d 79, 84
(Tex. Civ. App. 1983).
7. Proponents of "day in the life" films have enjoyed a great deal of success in admitting
the films into evidence. See, e.g., Grimes v. Employers' Mutual Liab. Ins. Co., 73 F.R.D. 607
(D. Alaska 1977); Maher v. General Motors Corp., No. 74-1660 (10th Cir. July 2, 1975), cited
in 19 ATLA NEws L. 59 (1976); Pisel v. Stamford Hosp., 180 Conn. 314, 430 A.2d 1 (1980);
Capara v. Chrysler Corp., 71 A.D.2d 515, 423 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1979), aff'd, 52 N.Y.2d 114, 417
N.E.2d 545, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1981); Air Shields, Inc. v. Speers, 590 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1979); Farmer v. Boyles Bros. Drilling Co., cited in 18 ATLA Naws L. 8 (1975).
8. Despite the general tendency to admit these films, see supra note 7, there have been a
number of instances in which the court held that the particular film involved was inadmissi-
ble. See, e.g., Butler v. Chrestman, 264 So. 2d 812 (Miss. 1972). See also infra notes 147-66
and accompanying text.
9. The Virginia Supreme Court has addressed the admissibility of several types of evi-
dence similar to "day in the life" films. See infra notes 180-229 and accompanying text.
However, no reported case has addressed the admissibility of these films in Virginia. Mr.
Funk, one of the authors, represented the plaintiff in a case where a "day in the life" film
was admitted, over defendants' objection, using the procedure outlined in this article. The
case, Talbott v. Martin, No. LH46 (Cir. Ct. City of Richmond, Va. Sept., 1984), resulted in a
$1,000,000 verdict for the plaintiff.
10. See infra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
11. Three decisions have served as the primary precedential vehicles for the admission of
"day in the life" films in other jurisdictions. See infra notes 21-36 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 37-49 and accompanying text.
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fense attorneys.'" This article will proceed to outline available Vir-
ginia authority and demonstrate persuasive analogies supporting
the admissibility of these films.14 On the strength of these analo-
gies, and the evidentiary tools provided the proponent, this article
will conclude with the proposition that the Virginia Supreme
Court would uphold the admission of a properly authenticated
film.
II. PURPOSES OF "DAY IN THE LIFE" FILMS AND SUPPORTIVE
AUTHORITY
As some commentators have noted, the purpose for which these
films are admitted is not dramatization, but rather, illustration of
the expert testimony that will be presented to the jury.15 Another
commentator has noted that the pivotal value of these films rests
on the inability of many lawyers to effectively convey the horror of
severe injury.' These films can fill evidentiary gaps by portraying
the plaintiff in a typical day and demonstrating the constant care
that his condition requires.' 7
A "day in the life" film is usually documentary in nature, span-
ning fifteen to fifty minutes of viewing time.' 8 It is composed of
13. There are two categories of objections that are frequently raised when a proponent
seeks to admit a "day in the life" film. The first category includes traditional opponent
objections which are raised against all types of evidence, although more heatedly raised
against these films. See infra notes 50-146 and accompanying text. The second category of
objections appear to be peculiar to these films due to their unusual nature as a staged repro-
duction introduced by the plaintiff. See infra notes 147-66 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 180-229 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Begam & Begam, supra note 5, at 25, where the authors state, "the purpose
of the Day in the Life film is not to dramatize the client's injury but to illustrate the evi-
dence. This is, of course, the legal basis for its admissibility. The probative value of illus-
trating the expert testimony outweighs any prejudicial effect." Id.
16. Preiser & Hoffman, supra note 5, at 26.
17. Several commentators have contended that, due to the complexities involved in severe
personal injury cases, it would be useful for the jurors to spend a day with the plaintiff in
order to realize the impact the injury has on daily living. Such a procedure, however, would
clearly be impractical, and, consequently, a "day in the life" film provides an effective sub-
stitute. See Begam & Begam, supra note 5, at 25; Perlnan, supra note 2, at 37; Preiser &
Hoffman, supra note 5, at 26.
18. See Note, Day-in-the-Life Films: The Celluloid Witness Comes to the Aid of the
Plaintiff, 33 S.C.L. REv. 577, 577 (1982). Although this article will refer to the presentation
under the generic heading of "films," these presentations can be made on videotapes or film.
Distinguishing between these two types of audiovisual technology is beyond the scope of this
article. Basically, a "film" will look much like a simple home movie; while a videotape will
look like a television show. For an excellent discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of
each method, see Preiser & Hoffman, Day-in-the-Life Films - Coming of Age in the
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narrative units showing the plaintiff waking up, eating, undergoing
physical therapy and attempting various daily activities, and typi-
cally ends with the plaintiff going to bed. i" The desired effect of
this documentation is to demonstrate the tedium and frustration
the plaintiff suffers in the performance of simple, routine
activities.20
Generally proponents have been successful in admitting these
films into evidence."' "Day in the life" films that have been prop-
erly authenticated,2 and structured to survive the defendant's ob-
jections,"3 are usually admissible. An outline of the leading cases in
this area of the law will demonstrate the variety of factual circum-
stances in which these films are admitted, and will provide a start-
ing point for an analysis of the evidentiary principles governing ad-
mission. The most noteworthy case is Grimes v. Employers
Mutual Liability Insurance Co. 24 In Grimes, the plaintiff, having
suffered severe injury in an industrial accident, had a film pro-
duced which depicted him performing a variety of daily activities. 25
The court held that the film was admissible and relevant in por-
traying the nature and extent of the plaintiff's damages.2s The
court's analysis exemplifies the basic theme alluded to above: "day
in the life" films are generally admissible if the foundation is ade-
quate, and if they are not barred by a specific objection addressed
Courtroom, Part II, TRIAL, Sept. 1981, at 40.
19. The purpose of these films is to portray for the jury a "typical" day in the plaintiff's
life and, consequently, the film should include footage of several routine activities. See
Begam & Begam, supra note 5, at 26; Note, Plaintiffs Use of "Day in the Life" Films: A
New Look at the Celluloid Witness, 49 UMKC L. REv. 179, 181-82 (1981).
20. This inability to perform daily functions on his own is perhaps the least articulable
element of the plaintiff's damage claim. A "day in the life" film attempts to supplement the
plaintiff's presentation in order to adequately convey this loss to the jury. See Begam &
Begam, supra note 5, at 25, where the authors describe the frustration suffered by the
plaintiff:
Spend a full day with a young quadriplegic, from early morning when he awakens,
to late in the evening when he goes to sleep. Live each one of those 16 hours or so
with him and understand that you are witnessing his life, everyday, forever. Appreci-
ate fully the tedium, the frustration, the helplessness, the hopelessness - the hours it
takes to get out of bed, get washed, and get dressed - as contrasted with the minutes
it takes the non-handicapped to accomplish the same chores.
Id. See also Perlman, supra note 2, at 37; Preiser & Hoffman, supra note 5, at 26.
21. See infra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 37-49 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 50-146 and accompanying text.
24. 73 F.R.D. 607 (D. Alaska 1977).
25. Id. at 609.
26. Id.
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to the particular film. 7
In Pisel v. Stamford Hospital,2 s the conservator of the dece-
dent's estate brought a malpractice suit against the hospital for its
treatment of the decedent.2 9 The conservator offered a film depict-
ing the decedent during her daily routine as a patient in the hospi-
tal.s° The Pisel court upheld admission of the film stating that,
"while not pleasant viewing, [the film] fairly presented to the jury
Miss Pisel's condition and the type of care she was required to
receive.'3' l
A third case in which the court upheld admission of a "day in
the life" film is Capara v. Chrysler Corp.s2 In Capara, the plaintiff
was severely injured in an automobile collision and brought a prod-
ucts liability suit against Chrysler.3 3 The plaintiff sought to intro-
duce a ten minute film purporting to document the plaintiff's daily
routine as a quadriplegic.34 The Capara court upheld admission of
the film because it illustrated the injuries the plaintiff suffered,
and the care he required.35
These cases demonstrate the variety of factual circumstances
under which admission of these films has been upheld. Gaining ad-
mission of a "day in the life" film, however, is not a simple matter.
In addition to extensive foundation requirements, a wide range of
legitimate objections will be raised against an improper film. Be-
cause these films constitute a powerful evidentiary tool,36 most
27. The opinion's analytical structure seemed to indicate that there was a de facto pre-
sumption favoring admission of an authenticated film, and it was up to the defendant to
rebut with an effectively presented objection. The defendant objected to the film as irrele-
vant, prejudicial, cumulative and hearsay; each objection was rejected by the court in a step-
by-step fashion. Id. at 609-11. For a more thorough analysis of each of these objections, see
infra 50-146 and accompanying text.
28. 180 Conn. 314, 430 A.2d 1 (1980).
29. Id. at -, 430 A.2d at 5 (the decedent was suffering from a severe psychosis and,
allegedly due to the negligent care of the defendant, she killed herself).
30. Id.
31. Id. at - , 430 A.2d at 8.
32. 71 A.D.2d 515, 423 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1979), aff'd, 52 N.Y.2d 114, 417 N.E.2d 545, 436
N.Y.S.2d 251 (1981).
33. Id. at -, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 696.
34. Id. at -, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 698-99.
35. Id. at -, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 699.
36. Plaintiffs have often recovered large damage awards in cases involving "day in the
life" films. See, e.g., Munns v. Vaughan, No. 74-5870 (3d D. Alaska Oct. 22, 1976), cited in
20 ATLA L. REP. 128 (1977) (9.34 million dollars); Savage v. VanMarle, cited in 15 ATLA
NEws L. 219 (1972) (1.67 million dollars); Schnebly v. Baker, cited in 14 ATLA NEws L. 222
(1971) (1.014 million dollars); General Elec. Co. v. Bush, cited in 13 ATLA NEws L. 474
(1970) (3.5 million dollars). Some decisions indicate that these films are simply too powerful
1984]
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courts will closely analyze the merits of each objection, as well as
the thoroughness of the foundation, in order to ensure that the de-
fendant is not unduly prejudiced.
III. LAYING THE PROPER FOUNDATION
An adequate foundation has several components that counsel
must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court in order to assure
admissibility. The first component involves the film's relevance to
the immediate litigation.3 7 Generally, evidence will be deemed rele-
vant if it tends to prove or disprove some material issue in the
case.38 The proponents of these films typically seek admission for
one of two purposes: to illustrate testimony or as direct evidence of
an issue in the litigation. 9 Provided a proponent can demonstrate
the relevance of either of these purposes to a material issue-such
as pain and suffering, deprivation of enjoyment of life, extent of
injury-the "relevance" prong of the foundation requirements will
be satisfied. 0
A second foundation requirement is the authentication of the
film by the proponent." At one time, this requirement could only
to admit into evidence. See infra notes 147-66 and accompanying text.
37. Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible in a court of law. FED. R. EVID. 402.
See also Kortz v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 144 F.2d 676, 679 (10th Cir.) (photograph ad-
missable if identified as correct likeness of person or object it purports to represent), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 728 (1944); Grimes v. Employers Mutual Liab. Ins. Co., 73 F.R.D. 607, 609
(D. Alaska 1977) (photograph generally admissible if authenticated and relevant); Hayward
v. Ginn, 306 P.2d 320, 324 (Okla. 1957) (photograph admissible if proven to be a correct
representation of what it purports to reproduce); Note, supra note 18, at 578. See generally
Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 686, 691 (1958).
38. See FED. R. EvID. 401 (stating that relevant evidence is "evidence having any ten-
dency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."). See also
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 134, at 309-10 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as
MCCORMICK].
39. See Nielsen, Admissibility of Day in the Life Films in Personal Injury Litigation, 32
FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 235, 238 (1982). Motion pictures have long been recognized as valuable
direct and circumstantial evidence.
40. See Note, Day in the Life Films: New Limitations on Admissibility, 4 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOc. 357, 365 (1980). Relevant evidence has two components: probative value and materi-
ality. MCCORMICK, supra note 38, § 185, at 541. Probative value is the tendency of the evi-
dence to establish the proposition for which it is offered as proof. Id. Materiality involves an
analysis of the relationship between this proposition and the issues involved in the case. Id.
"What is 'in issue' ... is determined mainly by the pleadings, read in light of the rules of
pleading and controlled by the substantive law." Id. Thus, if the film tends to prove or
disprove a proposition "in issue," it is relevant.
41. See Note, supra note 18, at 578. See also Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 686, 692 (1958), where
the authors have delineated several categories of information necessary to authenticate a
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be satisfied by the presentation of detailed, technical testimony
from an expert.42 Modern courts, however, now permit authenticity
to be established by the testimony of an uninterested witness pre-
sent during the filming.43 This witness should identify the persons
involved in the production of the film, and testify that the film
accurately represents that which the proponent is attempting to
portray.44 Basically, this authentication procedure requires the wit-
ness to testify that the contents of the film are representative of a
"typical" day in this plaintiff's life, and that the amount of staging
and rehearsal were kept to a minimum.45
Finally, the proponent should assure the court that the defen-
dant has had an opportunity to view the entire film prior to trial.
Although this is not a formal requirement of an adequate founda-
tion,46 this course of action has essentially become a procedural
prerequisite to admission of the film. 47 By allowing the opponent
motion picture:
Although not all of the following details have been expressly required by the courts
in all cases, it would seem that a proper authentication of motion pictures would
consist of four parts: (1) evidence as to the circumstances surrounding the taking of
the film. . . ; (2) the manner and circumstances surrounding the development of the
film; (3) evidence in regard to the projection of the films, including the speed at
which the projector is being run . . . ; (4) testimony by a person who was present at
the time the motion pictures were taken that the pictures accurately depict the
events as he saw them when they occurred.
Id.
42. See Note, supra note 18, at 578-79; 8 Asi. JUR. PROOF OF FAcTs 153 (1960).
43. See McCoRMICK, supra note 38, § 214, at 673, which provides:
More recently. . . it appears to have become generally recognized that. . . the relia-
bility and accuracy of the motion picture need not necessarily rest upon the validity
of the process used in its creation, but rather may be established by testimony that
the motion picture accurately reproduces phenomena actually perceived by the wit-
ness. Under this theory, though the requisite foundation may, and usually will, be
laid by the photographer, it may also be provided by any witness who perceived the
events filmed.
(emphasis added); Grimes v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 73 F.R.D. 607, 609 (authentica-
tion was adequate when the witness testified that the film accurately portrayed what he had
observed).
44. See Note, supra note 18, at 579-80.
45. Since the purpose of a "day in the life" film is to demonstrate an ordinary day in the
plaintiff's life, authenticity necessarily requires that the contents accurately depict such a
day. One commentator has recommended that the proponent thoroughly plan the entire
film in advance, before any footage is shot, in order to more accurately portray a "typical"
day. Preiser & Hoffman, supra note 5, at 30.
46. The most frequently enumerated foundation requirements are relevance and authen-
ticity. See Note, supra note 18, at 578.
47. See 3 C. SCOTT, PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE § 1299, at 161 (2d ed. 1969). See also Mill-
ers' Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Wichita Flour Mills Co., 257 F.2d 93, 98 (10th Cir. 1958) (implying that
caution and fairness should be considered in the admission of films). In Grimes v. Employ-
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to view the film prior to trial, the proponent not only demonstrates
his good faith to the court,48 but also deprives the defendant of the
contention that the introduction of the film constituted an unfair
surprise.49
IV. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS TO A "DAY IN THE LIFE" FILM
A. Prejudicial Content
Although evidence must be relevant to be admissible,50 a basic
evidentiary doctrine requires that all evidence, regardless of its rel-
evance, must be balanced against its prejudicial impact.' If the
prejudice that would result from admitting the evidence outweighs
its probative value, then the evidence must be excluded.52  As a
conceptual matter, the term "prejudice" encompasses a broad
range of objections. For example, if evidence is determined to be
cumulative, then it is by nature unduly prejudicial.5 3 For present
purposes, however, the analysis of the objection of undue prejudice
will focus upon the nature of the film's content.5 4
ers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 73 F.R.D. 607 (D. Alaska 1977), the reported decision was actually a
result of the plaintiff filing a motion in limine for a pretrial hearing to determine the admis-
sibility of the film. Id. at 608. Thus, not only should the proponent provide the opponent
with an opportunity to view the film prior to trial, but he might also consider moving for a
preliminiary hearing to determine admissibility. This procedure may serve to minimize the
film's potential prejudice. See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
48. Because of the powerful evidentiary nature of these films, see supra note 36 and ac-
companying text, it would be wise for the proponent to be as cooperative as possible with
both the court and the opponent, while at the same time steadfastly arguing for
admissibility.
49. See Grimes, 73 F.R.D. at 611 ("[T]he plaintiff has revealed his intention to offer the
film sufficiently in advance of trial, and thus the defendant cannot claim surprise."). Courts
frequently hold that unfair surprise is a strong factor favoring exclusion. See, e.g., Balian v.
General Motors, 121 N.J. Super. 118, -, 296 A.2d 317, 323-24 (1972), cert. denied, 62 N.J.
195, 299 A.2d 729 (1973).
50. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
51. Grimes v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 73 F.R.D. 607, 609 (D. Alaska 1977); Balian
v. General Motors, 121 N.J. Super. 118, -, 296 A.2d 317, 321 (1972), cert. denied, 62 N.J.
195, 299 A.2d 729 (1973); Capara v. Chrysler Corp., 71 A.D.2d 515, -, 423 N.Y.S.2d 694,
698-99, aff'd, 52 N.Y.2d 114, 417 N.E.2d 251 (1981).
52. FED. R. EVID. 403 states that, "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
53. Id. For a separate discussion of the objection that evidence is cumulative, see infra
notes 78-93 and accompanying text. Evidence that is held to be ex parte testimony can also
be excluded as unduly prejudicial. See Foster v. Crawford Shipping Co., 496 F.2d 788, 791-
92 (3d Cir. 1974). For a discussion of the ex parte testimony objection, see infra notes 114-
31 and accompanying text.
54. This distinction is important to the article's analysis because it is the contents of
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Evidence will usually be excluded as prejudicial when admission
would serve only to inflame the sympathy of the jury.5 5 The most
frequent ground for determining that a "day in the life" film is
inflamatory is when the footage includes the plaintiff's expressions
and utterances indicating pain. In Butler v. Chrestman,57 the
Mississippi Supreme Court excluded a film for precisely this rea-
son. The plaintiff, severely injured in a car accident, sought to in-
troduce at trial a short film depicting his physical therapy ses-
sion. 8 The footage included several segments showing the plaintiff
grimacing, and concluded with a scene in which the plaintiff cried
in agony.5 9 The Butler court excluded the film because it was
merely "depicting excruciating pain and suffering rather than at-
tempting to reveal the actual state of the injuries. '60
A "day in the life" film often has a powerful impact upon the
overall effectiveness of the plaintiff's case.61 Although it might be
tempting to include sensitive scenes in hopes of a large recovery,62
Butler illustrates the danger of including expressions of pain in the
presentation. The language used in Butler63 indicates the delicate
balance that exists between admissible evidence graphically por-
traying an injury, and inadmissible prejudicial anguish.6 4 Under-
standing this subtle distinction can result in admission of "day in
the life" films when counsel has carefully scrutinized its contents. 5
these films that will have the most powerful influence over the jurors. Consequently this will
be a subject of acute concern to the trial court.
55. See, e.g., Thomas v. C.G. Tate Constr. Co., 465 F. Supp. 566, 569 (D.S.C. 1979);
Grisom v. Logan, 334 F. Supp. 273, 279 (C.D. Cal. 1971); Butler v. Chrestman, 264 So. 2d
812, 816 (Miss. 1972); Kickham v. Carter, 314 S.W.2d 902, 908 (Mo. 1958); Wilson v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, -, 577 P.2d 1322, 1331 (1978).
56. See Note, supra note 40, at 359-60. See also Peters v. Hockley, 152 Or. 434, 53 P.2d
1059 (1936) (holding that the trial court's admission of a demonstration of the plaintiff's
injuries in which the plaintiff cried out in pain was an abuse of discretion).
57. 264 So.2d 812 (Miss. 1972).
58. Id. at 816.
59. Id. (noting the highly inflammatory content of the film, which included footage where
the "camera zooms in periodically to show Miss Chrestman's discomfort by grimaces and
ends with a parting shot of her seemingly crying from excruciating pain.").
60. Id. The Butler court went on to state, "[t]he nature of this film was more likely to
inflame and prejudice the jury rather than to serve any evidentiary purpose." Id.
61. See Begam & Begam, supra note 5, at 25; Perlman, supra note 2, at 37; Preiser &
Hoffman, supra note 5, at 26.
62. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
63. See supra text accompanying note 60.
64. The Butler decision implied a distinction between inadmissible demonstrations of
pain and suffering, and admissible demonstrations of the plaintiff's injury. 264 So. 2d at 816.
65. This distinction was used in the plaintiff's favor in Swaggart v. Haney, 363 So. 2d 251
(Miss. 1978), a case which distinguished Butler. In Swaggart, the plaintiff sought to admit
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For example, in Capara v. Chrysler Corp.,66 the court upheld ad-
mission of a film including footage of the plaintiffs daily routine at
his parents' home.6 7 Despite an objection that the film was prejudi-
cial,68 the court held that the footage illustrated the injury in an
informative manner. 9 In upholding admission, the court indicated
that a graphic portrayal of the plaintiff's injury was permissible
because "while the scenes are undoubtedly unpleasant, so too is
plaintiff's injury. '7 0
In light of the potential for prejudice, it is clear that plaintiff's
counsel should closely monitor the contents of the film during its
production. This issue is not nearly so crucial, however, if the pro-
ponent provides the court and opposing counsel an opportunity to
view the entire film prior to trial.1 If such an opportunity is made
available, prejudicial matter can be promptly deleted,72 thereby
minimizing the effectiveness of an opponent's objection at trial. In
several photographs depicting in detail the burns he had suffered. Although Swaggart in-
volved photographs, the grounds for distinction was not the method of presentation but the
content of the evidence. The Swaggart court held that, in contrast to Butler, the evidence
presented showed "no grimace or expression of pain on [the plaintiff's] face. Absent any
showing of facial expression of pain, crying or the like, we do not think that the trial judge
abused his discretion by allowing the jurors to see the pictures." Id. at 254. Swaggart is
complemented by a line of cases which basically hold that, although the evidence presented
was gruesome, it was nonetheless admissible because it accurately depicted the plaintiff's
injury. See Anderson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 377 F. Supp. 136, 140-41 (E.D. La. 1974)
(photographs of horribly burned child admitted into evidence); Lehmeth v. Long Beach
Unified School Dist., 53 Cal. 2d 544, -, 348 P.2d 887, 894, 2 Cal. Rptr. 279, 286 (1960)
(introduction allowed of film depicting plaintiff in hospital with a tracheotomy tube in her
throat and her body unconsciously flinching); Air Shields, Inc. v. Spears, 590 S.W.2d 574,
580 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (court admitted motion pictures of child blinded by disease con-
tracted while in defendant's incubator).
66. 71 A.D.2d 515, 423 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1979), afl'd, 52 N.Y.2d 114, 417 N.E.2d 545, 436
N.Y.S.2d 251 (1981).
67. 71 A.D.2d at -, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 698.
68. Id.
69. Id. at -, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 698-99.
70. Id.; see also Pisel v. Stamford Hosp., 180 Conn. 314, -, 430 A.2d 1, 8 (1980) (ad-
mitting videotape of psychiatric patient's daily routine). It has been contended that in addi-
tion to the inclusion in the film of the unavoidably unpleasant scenes depicting the plain-
tiff's debilitation, the proponent would be wise to include footage demonstrating the
plantiff's achievements and positive actions. The argument suggests that the jury will be
more willing to give a large award to a plaintiff who is trying to help himself than to a
hopeless case. See Perlman, supra note 2, at 37; Preiser & Hoffman, supra note 5, at 30;
Note, supra note 40, at 367 (suggesting that this procedure can also be used to minimize the
film's potential prejudicial impact).
71. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
72. Some courts have held, however, that the trial court is under no obligation to edit the
film, thus implying that the proponent bears the risk of the court's discretion. See, e.g.,
Morris v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 346 Mo. 126, -, 139 S.W.2d 984, 988 (1940).
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Grimes v. Employers Mutuality Liability Insurance Co., the plain-
tiff moved for a preliminary hearing to determine the admissibility
of his "day in the life" film.73 The film included both a delicate
scene with his crippled brother,74 and a segment portraying the
plaintiff in his daily routine.7" The Grimes court held that the
scene with the brother was unduly prejudicial, and, consequently,
required its deletion.76 Despite finding a portion of the film inad-
missible, the Grimes court found that the segment portraying rou-
tine activities was admissible because its probative value out-
weighed any prejudicial impact.77 Thus, the proponent's request
for a preliminary hearing can be a powerful evidentiary weapon to
deprive the opponent of an objection that, otherwise, could be very
effective at trial.
B. Cumulative Evidence
When evidence is determined to be cumulative, it is inadmissible
because its introduction merely delays the proceeding without ad-
ding anything of substantive value.78 This objection is most fre-
quently raised when the plaintiff attempts to introduce a "day in
the life" film having previously presented substantial testimony re-
garding his physical condition.79 It is generally held, however, that
motion pictures are only cumulative of previously introduced pho-
tographic evidence.8 0 This view was slightly expanded in Grimes v.
73. 73 F.R.D. 607, 608 (D. Alaska 1977).
74. Id. at 610 (depicting the injured plaintiff putting a cigarette in the mouth of his
quadriplegic brother).
75. Id. (the scenes included, among other things, the plaintiff driving a car, loading a gun,
and operating a fishing reel).
76. Id. ("scenes of the plaintiff ... with his quadriplegic brother serve little purpose
other than to create sympathy for the plaintiff.").
77. Id. The Grimes court outlined the theoretical underpinnings of admitting films de-
picting daily activities in a realistic but noninflammatory manner: "The films illustrate, bet-
ter than words, the impact the injury has had on the plaintiff's life in terms of pain and
suffering and loss of enjoyment of life. While the scenes are unpleasant, so is plaintiffs
injury." Id. (emphasis added).
78. See FED. R. EVID. 403; C. FRIEND, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN VIRGINIA § 138, at 319 (2d
ed. 1983).
79. See, e.g., Grimes v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 73 F.R.D. 607, 610 (D. Alaska
1977); Butler v. Chrestman, 264 So. 2d 812, 816 (Miss. 1972); Capara v. Chrysler Corp., 71
A.D.2d 515, -, 423 N.Y.S.2d 694, 698 (1979), aff'd, 52 N.Y.2d 114, 417 N.E.2d 545, 436
N.Y.S.2d 251 (1981).
80. 2 C. ScoTT, PHOTOGRAPnC EVIDENCE § 1022, at 332-33 (2d ed. 1969). See also Grimes
v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 73 F.R.D. 607, 610 (D. Alaska 1979); Note, supra note 18,
at 585. But see Balian v. General Motors, 121 N.J. Super. 118, -, 296 A.2d 317, 324
(1972) (court indicated that films were per se cumulative).
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Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co.81 In Grimes, the defen-
dant contended that the film was cumulative of medical testimony
that had been introduced.8 2 The court held that, in spite of previ-
ously presented evidence, the film was not cumulative because it
was the "best evidence of the plaintiff's pain and suffering and loss
of enjoyment of life."8
Similar reasoning was employed in Capara v. Chrysler Corp.,
where the trial court had rejected the defendant's claim that intro-
duction of the film was repetitious of prior medical testimony."
The Capara court held that the presentation of a significant
amount of medical testimony did not render the film cumulative
evidence because the film illustrated the testimony and demon-
strated the impact the injury had on the plaintiff's life.85 These
cases provide the proponent with a broad evidentiary base by al-
lowing thorough medical testimony to be complemented and sup-
plemented by the presentation of a "day in the life" film.'
Despite this strong precedent favoring the proponent's position,
an objection to evidence as cumulative remains one of the most
effective objections at the opponent's disposal. An example of this
effectiveness is found in Haddad v. Kuriger,87 where the defendant
appealed the admission at trial of a photograph depicting the scars
on an injured infant's head.8 The court held that the admission of
the photograph was reversible error because it was cumulative evi-
81. 73 F.R.D. 607 (D. Alaska 1977).
82. Id. at 610.
83. Id. Other courts have also held that these films, although repetitive may be admitted.
In Apache Ready Mix Co. v. Creed, 653 S.W.2d 79 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983), the court admitted
a "day in the life" film because of its value in demonstrating the plaintiff's injury, despite
the court's finding that the film repeated previous testimony. Id. at 84.
84. 71 A.D.2d 515, -, 423 N.Y.S.2d 694, 698 (1979), af'd, 52 N.Y.2d 114, 417 N.E.2d
545, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1981).
85. Id. at __, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 699. The court stated:
Moreover, the mere fact that there is ample uncontradicted medical testimony con-
cerning the nature and extent of plaintiff's injuries should not, in and of itself, pre-
vent a plaintiff from showing to the jury a motion picture illustrating in an informa-
tive and noninflammatory manner the impact that the accident has had on his or her
life.
Id. But see infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
86. If the proponent can satisfy the court that an objection of cumulative evidence is
unmerited, then the proponent will be able to introduce both oral testimony from a medical
expert and the "day in the life" film. This combination results in a very comprehensive
presentation to the jury.
87. 437 S.W.2d 524 (Ky. 1968).
88. Id. at 525.
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dence of previous testimony."9 A significant body of case authority
has held similar evidence to be inadmissibly cumulative. 90 Al-
though this authority did not involve "day in the life" films, it
should demonstrate, to both the opponent and proponent, the po-
tential viability of this objection. However, with the support of
Grimes9' and Capara,92 and a carefully tailored evidentiary presen-
tation, most courts will probably admit the film over the
objection. 3
C. Hearsay
Hearsay involves an out-of-court statement that is offered for
the truth of the contents of that statement.94 If the out-of-court
"statement" is nonverbal, then it must constitute "assertive con-
duct" to be excluded as hearsay. 95 An opponent of a "day in the
life" film typically attempts to prevent its admission on this
ground. The opponent contends that the film, although nonverbal,
involves assertive conduct on the part of the plaintiff, and is of-
fered for the truth of its contents-to demonstrate the plaintiff's
89. Id. at 525-26 ("the photographer was permitted to testify to almost all of the condi-
tions disclosed by the photographs. Under the circumstances, admission would have served
no useful purpose and would have only inflamed the jury.") (quoting Freeman v. Oliver M.
Elam Jr. Co., 372 S.W.2d 796, 798 (Ky. 1963)).
90. See, e.g., Johnson v. William C. Ellis & Sons Iron Works, 604 F.2d 950, 958 (5th Cir.
1979) (excluded film depicting cotton press that had injured plaintiff because of previous
testimony describing the machine); Grisom v. Logan, 334 F. Supp. 273, 279 (C.D. Cal. 1971)
(photograph of decedent who had been shot to death excluded because of previous testi-
mony regarding the position and condition of the body); Kickham v. Carter, 314 S.W.2d 902,
908 (Mo. 1958) (where the court excluded photographs demonstrating an operation because
there was no controverted factual issue concerning operation); Balian v. General Motors, 121
N.J. Super. 118, -, 296 A.2d 317, 322 (1972) (excluded motion pictures depicting tests
and experiments involving allegedly defective automobile because of previous expert testi-
mony as to the defective condition of the vehicle).
91. Grimes v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 73 F.R.D. 607 (D. Alaska 1977).
92. Capara v. Chrysler Corp., 71 A.D.2d 515, -, 423 N.Y.S.2d 694, 698-99 (1979), aff'd,
52 N.Y.2d 114, 417 N.E.2d 545, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1981).
93. This is another circumstance in which plaintiff's counsel owes his client the duty to
closely monitor not only the contents of the film, but the magnitude of the total presenta-
tion. If counsel is fearful of a successful objection that the evidence is cumulative, the best
strategy is to introduce only necessary medical testimony prior to introduction of the film.
These films leave a powerful impression upon the jury. See Note, supra note 18, at 586.
Therefore, the proponent should make sure the film is accepted first, since additional medi-
cal testimony can always be introduced later.
94. FED. R. EviD. 801(c) (" 'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted."). See also C. FRIEND, supra note 78, § 223, at 479; MCCORMICK, supra note 38, §
246, at 729.
95. FED. R. EVID. 801(a)(2); MCCORMICK, supra note 38, § 250, at 736-37.
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injuries.96
Although this line of reasoning has potential exclusionary force,
there are several techniques by which the proponent can avoid ex-
clusion of the film. First, the proponent could argue that the very
nature of these films compels the conclusion that the conduct is
nonassertive. Since the recorded events are designed to represent a
routine day in the plaintiff's life, no "implied assertion" can be
derived from viewing these normal activities.97 Second, the propo-
nent could argue that the film does not suffer from the traditional
hearsay infirmities, and therefore, should not be excluded.98 These
infirmities usually involve an adversary's inability to confront or
cross-examine the original speaker, or an objection that the origi-
nal speaker was not under oath when the statement was made.99
Where the plaintiff and film crew are present at trial and suscepti-
ble to cross-examination under oath, however, admission of the
film does not involve traditional hearsay risks.100 A third argument
the proponent could raise is that the film is offered for the narrow
purpose of illustrating prior testimony and, consequently, is not of-
fered for the "truth of the matter asserted.''
1
Despite this tactical maneuvering by the proponent of a "day in
the life" film, the opponent will have a substantial basis for con-
tending that the film is hearsay. In Grimes v. Employers Mutual
Liability Insurance Co.,'012 the defendant objected to the admission
of the film because it constituted hearsay evidence. 10 3 The court
initially noted that motion pictures are generally not considered
hearsay because the authenticating witnesses are available for
96. See Note, supra note 18, at 580. See also Foster v. Crawford Shipping Co., 496 F.2d
788, 791 (3d Cir. 1974) (indicating that the film was assertive conduct by stating that it "has
a communicative content other than merely pictorial.").
97. See McCORMICK, supra note 38, § 250, at 739; Note, supra note 18, at 581.
98. See Note, supra note 18, at 581.
99. See McCoRMICK, supra note 38, § 245, at 726-27.
100. See Grimes v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 73 F.R.D. 607, 610-11 (D. Alaska
1977); Reggio v. Louisiana Gas Serv. Co., 333 So. 2d 395, 396 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Richard-
son v. Missouri-K.-T. Ry., 205 S.W.2d 819, 823 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d
686, 689 (1958).
101. Basically, this argument is derived from an evidentiary scenario where the medical
testimony is used to prove the plaintiff's condition, and the film is used only as an illustra-
tion of what the testimony has proven, not as an independent source of proof. The use of
these films for illustrative purposes is well established. See supra notes 39 & 85 and accom-
panying text.
102. 73 F.R.D. 607 (D. Alaska 1977).
103. Id. at 610.
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cross-examination. 10 4 The court held, however, that since the "day
in the life" film was prepared by the plaintiff, it constituted asser-
tive conduct on his part, and, therefore, constituted hearsay
evidence. 105
Although conceding the hearsay argument, the court did not ex-
clude the film, but rather admitted it under one of the exceptions
to the hearsay rule,106 Rule 803(24) of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence.107 Exceptions to the hearsay rule' 08 allow evidence, although
analytically hearsay, to be introduced on the strength of policy
considerations supporting admission.'0 9 Rule 803(24)110 provides
that hearsay evidence is admissible if it is the most probative evi-
dence available, satisfies the reliability requirements of the hearsay
rule, and is offered only after advance notice is given to the oppo-
nent."' The Grimes court held that admission was proper because
the film was highly probative and had been viewed by the defen-
dant prior to trial." 2 Thus, the hearsay objection might be obvi-
ated because the requirements of this exception can be satisfied by
the same procedural hurdles that the proponent must overcome to
introduce the film into evidence." 3
104. Id. at 610-11 (rationale supporting this rule "is that the verifying witness is merely
using the film as a means of communicating his observations."). See also Paradis, The Cel-
luloid Witness, 37 U. COLo. L. REv. 235, 262 (1965).
105. Grimes, 73 F.R.D. at 611, where the court stated:
[A] film offered by the plaintiff showing the plaintiff performing tasks to exhibit his
disability is like a witness testifying about assertive conduct. A witness' testimony
about observed assertive conduct when used to prove the truth of the assertion would
be hearsay, and similarly a film showing assertive conduct would be hearsay.
But see supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
106. Grimes, 73 F.R.D. at 611.
107. FED. R. EVID. 803(24).
108. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1)-(24), 804(b)(1)-(5).
109. See McCoRMIcK, supra note 38, § 253, at 753 (exceptions usually involve situations
with recognizable guarantees of trustworthiness).
110. FED. R. EVID, 803(24).
111. FED. R. EVID. 803(24) provides that evidence can be admitted which consists of:
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that
(A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more
probative on the point for which it is admitted ... ; and (C) the general purposes of
these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the state-
ment into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception
unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance
of the trial ... his intention to offer the statement ....
Id.
112. Grimes, 73 F.R.D. at 611.
113. A "day in the life" film is highly probative of a number of material issues in the
plaintiff's case. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text. The requirements of trust-
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D. Ex Parte Testimony
The defendant may object to the film's admissibility because of
the absence of defense counsel when the film was produced." 4 In
other words, the opponent would contend that the film constitutes
the plaintiff's ex parte testimony.115 This objection was success-
fully raised in Foster v. Crawford Shipping Co." 6 In Foster, the
plaintiff was injured while unloading a ship and brought suit
against the shipping company.' 7 During the trial, the plaintiff's
counsel, without notifying the defendant, prepared a videotape de-
picting the plaintiff grunting and groaning in a futile attempt to
answer questions." 8 Although the plaintiff was not present at the
trial, his counsel sought to introduce the film to illustrate medical
testimony." 9 The trial court had admitted the film, but the Third
Circuit reversed on the grounds that the film was ex parte testi-
mony and, consequently, unduly prejudicial.2 0
Despite the possible implications of Foster, an objection to a
"day in the life" film as ex parte testimony seldom succeeds. As
one commentator has noted, the strategic use of medical testimony
may deprive the defendant of an effective objection. 21 This tech-
nique involves the introduction of medical testimony during the
worthiness underlying the hearsay exception are satisfied by the proponent's extensive au-
thentication requirements. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text. The proponent is
strongly advised to provide the opponent the opportunity to view the entire film prior to
trial. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text. Thus, these basic requirements of an
adequate foundation mirror to a large degree the elements which must be satisfied in order
to trigger the hearsay exception of Rule 803(24). See supra note 111.
114. This objection is similar to the hearsay objection in that the opponent contends that
admission of the film is the equivalent of introducing testimony that is not subject to cross-
examination.
115. See Note, supra note 40, at 360-61.
116. 496 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1974).
117. Id. at 790.
118. Id. (the purpose of this videotape was to demonstrate the plaintiff's severe schizo-
phrenia, allegedly resulting from the injury).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 792 (rejecting proponent's "illustration of medical testimony" argument by
holding that "any benefit which might have been derived in the fact-finding process by such
an illustration was far outweighed by the prejudice of admitting what amounted to ex parte
testimony from the absent incompetent."). A strong argument exists, however, that might
help the proponent distinguish Foster on the facts. In attempting to support admission of
the film as illustrative of the medical testimony, the Foster court pointed out that the medi-
cal testimony actually indicated that the film did not accurately represent the plaintiff's
condition. Id. at 791. Thus, the proponent in Foster did not have a legitimate basis underly-
ing the justification he offered the court.
121. Note, supra note 19, at 185.
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film's presentation, thereby allowing the medical personnel to tes-
tify as to the accuracy of the film's contents.122 The result is that
the defense now has a witness subject to cross-examination.123
The objection may fail, even without employing this tactic, be-
cause other key witnesses are present at trial and subject to cross-
examination.124 In Reggio v. Louisiana Gas Service Co., 1 5 the
plaintiff was injured in a gas explosion and offered a videotape
portraying his extensive physical therapy.126 The trial court viewed
the videotape prior to trial, and deleted prejudicial pQrtions at that
point. 217 Nevertheless, the defendant objected to the videotape as
ex parte testimony because it was not subject to cross-examina-
tion.128 The Reggio court, however, admitted the film because the
plaintiff's therapist was present at the trial and could be cross-ex-
amined.129 In Grimes v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance
Co.,130 this analysis was extended when the court held that the de-
fendant's opportunity to cross-examine witnesses verifying the film
was enough to render the ex parte objection ineffective.' 31
E. Editing
Although the production of a "day in the life" film frequently
involves several hours of footage, it would be impractical, and pos-
sibly detrimental to the plaintiff, to require the jury to view the
entire film. 32 Consequently, the proponent should seek to intro-
duce only edited versions of the actual footage.'33 This procedure,
122. Id. ("The medical witness should be able to state his opinion and simultaneously use
the movie to aid and illustrate his diagnosis for the jury.").
123. This strategy has found support in a few jurisdictions. See Munns v. Vaughn, No.
74-5870 (3d D. Alaska Oct. 22, 1976), cited in 20 ATLA L. REP. 128 (1977); Garcher v. City
of Tamarac, 20 ATLA L. REP. 171 (1976).
124. It should be obvious to the proponent that all witnesses even remotely connected
with the making of the film should be present in court.
125. 333 So. 2d 395 (La. Ct. App. 1976).
126. Id. at 402.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 73 F.R.D. 607 (D. Alaska 1977).
131. Id. at 611.
132. See Preiser & Hoffman, supra note 5, at 26; Note, supra note 18, at 582. In order to
avoid boring the jury one commentator has suggested 30 minutes as an ideal length for the
film. See Begam & Begam, supra note 5, at 26.
133. See Note, supra note 18, at 583 (suggesting that. editing is also useful in order to
remove scenes which are embarrassing to the plaintiff, where the plaintiff "freezes" before
the camera, and where prejudice may arise when the plaintiff has cried out in pain).
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however, provides the opponent with an additional objection on
the ground that an edited version conveys a distorted view of real-
ity to the jury.13 4 The theoretical underpinnings of this objection
involve the alleged prejudice resulting from a selective, limited
coverage of the subject matter.135 In Burd v. Vercruyssen,"6 the
plaintiff's decedent was killed by an automobile, and the plaintiff
sought to introduce photographs of the body in order to imply the
speed of the defendant's vehicle. 3 7 The court excluded the evi-
dence because the photographs only portrayed a portion of the de-
cedent's body and, therefore, any inferences would be speculative
and prejudicial. 138
In spite of this contrary authority, the majority of jurisdictions
hold that edited films are admissible, provided the accuracy of
their contents has been established. 3 9 Although admissibility is
not affected, many courts will hold that the presence of editing di-
minishes the film's evidentiary weight. 40 The proponent can avoid
134. See, e.g., Millers' Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Wichita Floor Mills Co., 257 F.2d 93, 100 (10th
Cir. 1958); Grimes, 73 F.R.D. at 610; International Union, United Auto., Aircraft & Agric'l
Implement Workers v. Russell, 264 Ala. 456, -, 88 So. 2d 175, 186 (1956), aff'd, 356 U.S.
634 (1958); Mercantile Bank v. Phillips, 260 Ark. 129, __, 538 S.W.2d 277, 282 (1976).
135. See, e.g., Haddad v. Kuriger, 437 S.W.2d 524, 525-26 (Ky. 1968). One commentator
has formulated an excellent rebuttal to this argument by contrasting the limited coverage of
"malingering plaintiff" films with the broader coverage of "day in the life" films. It is ac-
knowledged that "malingering plaintiff" films are routinely admitted into evidence. See
supra note 3 and accompanying text. From this judicial posture the commentator structures
an argument for admitting a "day in the life" film:
It mattered not that these [malingering plaintiff] motion pictures depicted only one
limited episode or activity engaged in by the plaintiff, or that the plaintiff may have
been disabled for hours or days following the activity in question. The films were-
and are-still admissible.
What the "Day in the Life" presentation attempts to do, however, is show an entire
routine day. Logically, then, it should be admitted more readily than defense films
depicting an isolated occurrence.
Preiser & Hoffman, supra note 5, at 28.
136. 142 N.J. Super. 344, 361 A.2d 571 (1976).
137. Id. at __, 361 A.2d at 577.
138. Id. See also Johnson v. William C. Ellis & Sons Iron Works, 604 F.2d 950, 958 (5th
Cir. 1979) (exclusion of film depicting a machine that injured the plaintiff because the film
only showed a portion of the apparatus), modified, 609 F.2d 820 (1980).
139. See, e.g., Millers' Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Wichita Flour Mills Co., 257 F.2d 93, 100 (10th
Cir. 1958) (an edited film is admissible "when it is shown that it is a correct likeness of the
objects which it purports to represent."); Mercantile Bank v. Phillips, 260 Ark. 129, __,
538 S.W.2d 277, 282 (1976) ("Here there is no evidence that the films do not represent an
accurate reproduction or that they convey a false impression. Counsel for appellant was
given an opportunity to view any edited portions of the film .... ).
"140. See, e.g., Millers' Nat'l Ins. Co., 257 F.2d at 100; International Union, United Auto.,
Aircraft & Agric'l Implement Workers v. Russell, 264 Ala. 456, -, 88 So. 2d 175, 186
(1956), aff'd, 356 U.S. 364 (1958); Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 686, 698 (1958).
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this outcome by providing the court and the defense with all ed-
ited portions prior to trial, and by providing a comprehensive
foundation at trial. 141
Ironically, the court in Grimes 14 seemed to imply a rather harsh
restriction on the use of nonjudicial editing.143 In enumerating the
requirements of an adequate foundation, the court included as a
criterion the absence of any editing in the film. 44 Consequently, as
one commentator has noted, this inclusion could be interpreted as
a total prohibition against nonjudicial, pretrial editing. 45 Such a
prohibition has been properly criticized as unduly restrictive, since
a pretrial hearing in which the court views both the finished film
and the edited portions can prevent prejudicial editing. 4
V. EXCLUSION OF THE EVIDENCE BECAUSE OF THE UNUSUAL
NATURE OF "DAY IN THE LIFE" FILMS
In addition to the more traditional objections outlined above,
the unusual nature of these films may raise additional arguments
for exclusion. A "day in the life" film represents the plaintiff's
staged reproduction of events to which the defendant is rarely in-
vited. 47 This one-sided situation gives rise to several possible ra-
tionales for excluding the film. First, the reproduction aspect ren-
ders the film self-serving evidence. 48 Second, the novelty of the
141. Since most of the evidentiary rulings on motion pictures are left to the sound discre-
tion of the trial judge, see supra note 6 and accompanying text, the more thoroughly the
proponent authenticates the film the better the chance it will receive full evidentiary weight.
142. Grimes v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 73 F.R.D. 607 (D. Alaska 1977).
143. See Note, supra note 18, at 583. The word "ironic" is used in this context because
the Grimes decision is usually viewed as highly favorable to the proponent of a "day in the
life" film.
144. Grimes, 73 F.R.D. at 609.
145. Note, supra note 18, at 583. -
146. Since proponents routinely provide the opponent and the court with an opportunity
to view the entire film prior to trial, see supra note 47 and accompanying text, it is argued
that this procedure provides adequate protection. Note, supra note 18, at 584. If the court
and the opponent view the edited film and all "out takes" at a pretrial hearing it is unrea-
sonable to exclude the film merely because the film has been previously edited.
147. This factor has caused several courts to proceed with caution before admitting the
film into evidence. See, e.g., Pisel v. Stamford Hosp., 180 Conn. 314, -, 430 A.2d 1, 8
(1980) (admitting the film but only after admonishing that "[wihen a film represents a
staged reproduction of one party's version of the facts it should be examined with care be-
cause of the danger that the filmmaker's art may blur reality in the minds of the jury."). For
guidance on the mechanics involved in minimizing this potential danger, see Preiser & Hoff-
man, supra note 5, at 30.
148. See infra notes 147-54 and accompanying text. See also Balian v. General Motors,
121 N.J. Super. 118, -, 296 A.2d 317, 322 (1972) (the court appeared to take the view
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:751
film may unreasonably dominate the other evidence introduced at
trial.149 In Haley v. Byers Transportation Co., 50 the plaintiff was
injured in an automobile collision and rendered a paraplegic. At
trial, the plaintiff sought to introduce a film depicting him in his
daily routine, including footage portraying his therapy with exer-
cise equipment.' 51 The plaintiff did not attempt to introduce any
of the equipment into evidence. 52 On appeal, the Haley court ex-
cluded the film because it was self-serving and would overwhelm
the jury.' The court believed that if the plaintiff wanted a more
detailed presentation, he should have introduced the exercise
equipment.'
The Haley decision implies that a "day in the life" film is an
inappropriate evidentiary device. 155  As one commentator has
noted, the Haley court based its opinion on the unavailability of
an established legal standard against which a "day in the life" film
could be compared to determine if the film was a proper represen-
tation. 56 In other words, the proponent must first employ less
drastic methods of evidentiary presentation if they are available. 57
In a similar fashion, Thomas v. C. G. Tate Construction Co.158
could be interpreted as a signal that courts will exclude these films
on the grounds of their unusual nature rather than on the merit of
a specific objection.159 In Thomas, the plaintiff was severely burned
and sought admission of a film showing his therapy sessions. 60 The
that films were per se self-serving), cert. denied, 62 N.J. 195, 299 A.2d 729 (1973); Orgeron
v. Tri-State Road Boring, Inc., 434 So. 2d 70, 73 (La. Ct. App. 1982), rev'd, 434 So. 2d 65
(1983).
149. See infra notes 158-64 and accompanying text.
150. 414 S.W.2d 777 (Mo. 1967).
151. Id. at 780.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. The decision in Haley implies the court's suspicion of the use of a "day in the
life" film as evidence. The court insisted that the plaintiff could have adequately presented
his case through production of the exercise equipment or through more detailed verbal de-
scriptions of his activities. Id. One court has declined to follow Haley by distinguishing it on
the grounds that the motion picture in Haley was inadmissible hearsay because none of the
equipment was presented at the trial. See McWilliams v. Wright, 460 S.W.2d 699, 705 (Mo.
1970).
155. 414 S.W.2d at 780; see also Note, supra note 19, at 183.
156. Note, supra note 19, at 183.
157. See Note, supra note 40, at 362-63 (author analyzes the concept which requires the
exclusion of the film if the proponent has less prejudicial evidence available).
158. 465 F. Supp. 566 (D.S.C. 1979).
159. See Note, supra note 40, at 364. See also infra note 162.
160. 465 F. Supp. at 568.
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court, however, refused to let the jury see it. 6 ' Although the pro-
ponent of a "day in the life" film might distinguish Thomas be-
cause of the basis of the one-sided nature of the plaintiff's film,
162
the decision to exclude the film in Thomas was not founded upon
any particular objection. 163 Rather, the court demonstrated great
reluctance toward the use of audiovisual technology generally by
stating that "[t]he novelty of using a videotape in the courtroom in
and of itself may make the tape stand out in the minds of the jury.
Unquestionably, it will dominate the evidentiary scene." ''"4
Thus, despite a majority position admitting into evidence au-
thenticated motion pictures, 16 5 the proponent of a "day in the life"
film is clearly not faced with merely artificial evidentiary require-
ments. These films may be excluded through a spectrum of specific
objections, or by courts, like the Haley and Thomas courts, which
believe that the distinctive nature of the evidence will unjustifiably
compel a jury verdict for the plaintiff. Consequently, the cautious
plaintiff's counsel will meticulously follow various safeguards to as-
sure admissibility. As previously stated, this strategy includes a
thorough foundation, a request for a pretrial hearing, and provid-
ing the court and the opponent with an opportunity to view the
entire film. 66
161. Id. at 571.
162. The film included footage where the plaintiff suffered through the painful therapy
necessary for all burn victims. The plaintiff's body was bathed, and a cloth was used to wipe
away dead skin. Throughout this process the plaintiff screamed in pain as his wife futilely
attempted to comfort him. Id. at 568. Obviously the contents of the film were highly preju-
dicial and would almost certainly be excluded by most courts in balancing this prejudice
against the probative value. See supra notes 51-70 and accompanying text.
163. Although the court spent considerable time discussing the contents of the film, the
opinion lacks a formal balancing process. No particular objection was ever elaborated upon
as the grounds for exclusion. See Thomas, 465 F. Supp. at 569-71. As one commentator has
noted, "[t]he court relied more upon the overall effect of the tape, than upon specific factors
which in the court's judgment rendered it prejudicial." Note, supra note 40, at 357-58.
164. Thomas, 465 F. Supp. at 571 (footnote omitted). See also Balian, 121 N.J. Super. at
-, 296 A.2d at 324 (court implied that motion pictures may be too spectacular in nature
to be properly handled by the jury). But see MCCORMICK, supra note 38, § 214, at 675
(stating that the vividness of a motion picture is of less concern today due to a higher level
of sophistication in the modern juror concerning motion pictures); Perlman, supra note 2, at
34 ("the average person has developed a sense of comfort and security with the cinematic
process, and enjoys a visual presentation much more than listening to an inanimate, boring,
and sleep-provoking presentation.").
165. See supra notes 7 & 21-35 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 37-49 and accompanying text. But see Thomas, 465 F. Supp. at 571
(implying that the unusual nature of a "day in the life" film may negate all of these proce-
dures: "The court can conceive of no way in which the defendant can possibly depict with
equal impact those periods of time during the plaintiff's recovery process when he was ei-
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:751
An additional safeguard exists, however, to increase the chances
of successful admission of the film. In light of the powerful influ-
ence that the film may exert, it has been suggested that the defen-
dant move the court to bifurcate the proceeding.167 This procedure
involves separating the trial into two segments: first, a determina-
tion of liability; and second, if liability is found, a separate deter-
mination of the resulting damages. 6 s This tactic allows the defen-
dant to remove the film from the evidentiary scene while the jury
determines whether the defendant is liable.169 Because a "day in
the life" film does not present evidence relevant to liability, but
rather attempts to demonstrate the extent of the injury, the defen-
dant is wise to limit the exposure of the film to the damages phase
of the trial.17
Although bifurcating the trial is usually viewed as a defense-ori-
ented tactic, the benefits of this procedure would appear to apply
with equal force to the plaintiff.' 7' Since the plaintiff can antici-
pate a barrage of objections to the introduction of these films, he
might undermine the contention of unfair prejudice by moving to
separate the trial. 1 2 This strategy might also persuade a reluctant
court to admit the film because the presentation of the film in the
damages phase will minimize its influence on the jury. 7 '
ther free of pain or relatively speaking, free of pain."). The Thomas court seems to imply
that even if the opponent is given advanced notice and an opportunity to view the film prior
to trial, the film will be excluded because the opponent is not able to produce his own "day
in the life" film. Id.
167. See Note, supra note 40, at 368; Note, supra note 18, at 588.
168. See Lis v. Robert Packer Hosp., 579 F.2d 819, 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
955 (1978); Beeck v. Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp., 562 F.2d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 1977); Moss v.
Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 23, 24 (6th Cir. 1965). In Grimes, the trial had been
separated into a liability phase to be followed by a separate determination of the resulting
damages. 73 F.R.D. at 610. This factor weighed heavily in the court's decision that the film
was not unduly prejudicial. The court stated that because "liability will have to be estab-
lished before the jury will be allowed to view the film, the admission of the film will not be
unduly prejudicial if the plaintiff shows that the daily activities were or are typical for the
plaintiff." Id. The Thomas court held that, but for the bifurcation of the proceedings in
Grimes, the Grimes court would have excluded the film. Thomas, 465 F. Supp. at 569.
169. See Note, supra note 40, at 368; Note, supra note 18, at 588.
170. Since the film only purports to demonstrate the injuries of the plaintiff, and the
impact the injuries have had on his life, it appears to be irrelevant to the issue of liability.
See FED. R. EvID. 401. The film does not attempt to prove who injured the plaintiff, only the
loss resulting from the injury. See Note, supra note 18, at 588.
171. See Note, supra note 40, at 369-70; Note, supra note 18, at 590-91.
172. See supra notes 50-146 and accompanying text.
173. The defendant will certainly contend that the admission of the film will effectively
determine the jury's decision on liability. Therefore, by removing the film from the eviden-
tiary scene during this determination, and only introducing it after liability is found, the
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The mechanics for bifurcating a trial are relatively straightfor-
ward. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) provides federal trial
judges with authority to bifurcate the proceeding.'7 4 This authority
is widely recognized as resting within the broad discretion of the
trial judge.175 Before exercising this discretion, the judge will usu-
ally require proof of the distinctiveness of the issues to be sepa-
rated.176 Although the decision to bifurcate is deferred to the dis-
cretion of the trial judge, the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule
42 indicate that the order should not be routinely granted. 177 Con-
sequently, at least one court has held that the routine granting of
this motion, without adequate analysis of the merits of the deci-
sion, constitutes reversible error.'78 Most courts, however, will not
reverse the trial judge's decision without a clear showing of an
abuse of discretion.179
VI. ADMISSIBILITY OF "DAY IN THE LIFE" FILMS IN VIRGINIA
The materials discussed above demonstrate the considerations
involved in determining the admissibility of a "day in the life"
film. A proponent in Virginia, however, faces an additional obstacle
proponent has preempted much of the force of an objection for undue prejudice. See Note,
supra note 40, at 369-70; Note, supra note 18, at 591.
174. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b), which provides that:
The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials
will be conducive to expedition and economy may order a separate trial of any claim,
cross-claim, counter-claim, or third-party claim, or any separate issue or any number
of claims, cross-claims, counter-claims, third-party claims, or issues ....
175. See, e.g., Davis v. Freels, 583 F.2d 337, 343 (7th Cir. 1978); Beeck v. Aquaslide 'N'
Dive Corp., 562 F.2d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 1977); Bowie v. Sorrell, 209 F.2d 49, 51 (4th Cir.
1953).
176. See Kushner v. Hendon Constr., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 93, 99 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd, 609 F.2d 502
(3d Cir. 1979); Davis v. Freels, 583 F.2d 337, 343 (7th Cir. 1978); Note, Separate Trials on
Liability and Damages in "Routine Cases". A Legal Analysis, 46 MINN. L. REV. 1059, 1073-
74 (1962); Note, supra note 18, at 589.
177. FED. R. Civ. P. 42 advisory committee notes.
178. Lis v. Robert Packer Hosp., 579 F.2d 819, 824 (3d Cir. 1978). In Lis, the court stated:
Although cognizant of these competing considerations [whether to bifurcate], this
court has heretofore cast its lot with the views expressed by the Advisory Committee
that bifurcation "be encouraged where experience has demonstrated its worth," but
that "separation of issues for trial is not to be routinely ordered .... .
A general policy of a district judge bifurcating all negligence cases offends the
philosophy that a decision must be made by a trial judge only as a result of an in-
formed exercise of discretion of the merits of each case.
Id.
179. See, e.g., Beeck v. Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp., 562 F.2d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 1977); C.W.
Regan, Inc. v. Parsons, Brickenhoff, Quade & Douglas, 411 F.2d 1379, 1388 (4th Cir. 1969);
Moss v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 23, 26 (6th Cir. 1965).
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because no direct authority exists specifically governing the admis-
sibility of these films. Nevertheless, a properly authenticated film
should be deemed admissible on the basis of analogies to existing
Virginia authority allowing the admission of similar evidence.8 0
There are four situations where the Virginia Supreme Court's ex-
pansive view of admissibility can be used to argue for the admis-
sion of "day in the life" films: (1) the general use of illustrative
evidence;' 8 (2) the use of photographs in both civil and criminal
cases; 82 (3) the use of videotapes in criminal cases;' ss and (4) the
use of audiovisual depositions.8 4 In all situations where these
types of evidence are offered, Virginia strictly adheres to the gen-
eral rule that admissibility rests within the sound discretion of the
trial court. 5 Thus, the proponent cannot rely solely on the analo-
gies provided below because admissibility will ultimately turn upon
the careful production and presentation of each film on a case-by-
case basis.
The Virginia Supreme Court has traditionally admitted illustra-
tive evidence,' 81 such as models, sketches and maps, provided that
the evidence is relevant. 87 Since this type of evidence is not in-
tended to duplicate the actual object or condition, but rather is
used to explain testimony, the authentication requirements are
minimal. 8 8 In fact, it is generally obvious to the jury that the evi-
dence is merely a general representation, to be used only as an ex-
180. See infra notes 181-229 and accompanying text. The Virginia practitioner should
also be aided by the use of the previously outlined case law as persuasive authority for the
admissibility of "day in the life" films.
181. See infra notes 186-91 and accompanying text.
182. See infra notes 192-213 and accompanying text.
183. See infra notes 214-22 and accompanying text.
184. See infra notes 222-29 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., Peterson v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 289, 294, 302 S.E.2d 520, 523 (1983);
Whitley v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 66, 75, 286 S.E.2d 162, 167 (1982); Clanton v. Common-
wealth, 223 Va. 41, 51, 286 S.E.2d 172, 177 (1982); Martin v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 436,
447, 271 S.E.2d 123, 130 (1980); Evans v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 609, 614, 212 S.E.2d 268,
272 (1975); Smith v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 459, 465, 150 S.E.2d 545, 549 (1966); Westry v.
Commonwealth, 206 Va. 508, 513, 144 S.E.2d 427, 430 (1965).
186. See, e.g., Moore v. Warren, 203 Va. 117, 122 S.E.2d 879 (1961); Peoples v. Common-
wealth, 147 Va. 692, 137 S.E. 603 (1927).
187. See Newton v. Carpenter, 202 Va. 347, 117 S.E.2d 109 (1960). See also C. FRIEND,
supra note 78, § 169, at 381.
188. See, e.g., Barber v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 241, 252, 142 S.E.2d 484, 493 (1965)
(prosecution could use toy pistol as illustrative evidence without demonstrating that the toy
was similar to the real gun); Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. v. Paul, 198 Va. 480, 486, 95 S.E.2d
179, 184 (1956) (use of model cars to demonstrate collision did not require proof that the
models used were in precise dimension with the real automobiles).
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planatory device. 89 Likewise, x-rays have been routinely held ad-
missible provided the proponent demonstrates that the x-ray is of
the person involved, was taken by a competent technician, and ac-
curately portrays the condition of the person's body. °90 The same
analysis applies even when the x-ray was prepared specifically for
litigation purposes. 9'
The Virginia Supreme Court has also generally allowed photo-
graphs to be admitted into evidence.'92 This general policy, how-
ever, is governed by many of the same evidentiary restraints that
other states have imposed upon the admission of "day in the life"
films.'9 3 The photograph must be relevant to a material issue in
the case. 94 Although authentication does not require detailed tech-
nical testimony, the verifying witness must convince the court that
the photograph accurately represents what that witness ob-
served. 95 Finally, even if the photograph is relevant and thor-
oughly authenticated, it may be excluded if the trial court, in its
sound discretion, concludes that admission would be unduly preju-
dicial.' 96 If a photograph survives this balancing process, it is ad-
missible in all proceedings, whether civil 197 or criminal. 198
189. See C. FRIEND, supra note 78, § 169, at 381, which states that:
Where the illustrative evidence's dissimilarity from the original scene or item is
such that confusion, distortion, or prejudice will result, it should be excluded, of
course. However, the court should consider carefully whether or not any confusion,
etc. will result. In most instances, it is perfectly clear (or can be made perfectly clear)
to the jury that the map or model is but a general representation, utilized as an ex-
planatory device only.
190. See Meade v. Belcher, 212 Va. 796, 801, 188 S.E.2d 211, 215 (1972).
191. See Lugo v. Joy, 215 Va. 39, 205 S.E.2d 658 (1974); C. FRIEND, supra note 78, § 170
at 385.
192. See, e.g., Bunch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423, 436, 304 S.E.2d 271, 278 (1983);
Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 513, 531, 273 S.E.2d 36, 48 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
1011 (1981); Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Anderson, 207 Va. 567, 571, 151 S.E.2d 628, 632
(1966); Timmons v. Commonwealth, 204 Va. 205, 214, 129 S.E.2d 697, 703 (1963); 14B
MICHIE'S JuR. Photographs and Photographers § 5 (Repl. Vol. 1978).
193. See supra notes 37-60 and accompanying text.
194. See Wright v. Kelly, 203 Va. 135, 141, 122 S.E.2d 670, 675 (1961); C. FRIEND, supra
note 78, § 170, at 384; 14B MICHIE'S JUR., supra note 192, § 5.
195. See Ferguson v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 745, 746, 187 S.E.2d 189, 190, cert. denied,
409 U.S. 861 (1972).
196. See Wright v. Kelly, 203 Va. 135, 141, 122 S.E.2d 670, 675 (1961) ("Photographs that
are calculated to arouse the sympathies or prejudices of the jury are properly excluded
...." (quoting 20 Am. JUR. Evidence § 729). See also 14B MIcHIE'S JUR., supra note 192, §
5.
197. See, e.g., Martin v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 1009, 1021, 37 S.E.2d 43, 48 (1946);
Staples v. Spence, 179 Va. 359, 363, 19 S.E.2d 69, 71 (1942). The Staples court, in allowing
photographs into evidence in a civil suit, demonstrated the similarities between admitting
photographs and admitting "day in the life" films by holding that, "'[t]he purpose of per-
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:751
For over a decade Virginia has followed the more expansive view
governing the purposes for which a photograph may be admitted.
In Ferguson v. Commonwealth,199 the court delineated two distinct
purposes supporting the admission of photographic evidence. The
first permits admission to illustrate the testimony of a witness. °0
Several states hold that this is the only purpose for which photo-
graphic evidence can be admitted.2 1 The court in Ferguson, how-
ever, found this theory inapplicable,2 2 and, therefore, redefined
existing Virginia law to allow admission of photographs for a sec-
ond purpose, namely as direct evidence of an issue in the case.20 3
Admission as direct evidence is supported by the "silent witness"
rule under which photographic evidence is held to be sufficient to
"speak for itself' without supportive oral testimony.2 4 In ex-
panding the functions that photographic evidence could serve, the
Virginia Supreme Court demonstrated a fairly permissive attitude
mitting the photograph of an object to be introduced in evidence is to furnish ocular proof
or pictorial communication of the condition of the object." Id. Since the Virginia Supreme
Court appears to appreciate the evidentiary value of visual aids it seems only a logical ex-
tension of this appreciation to admit a "day in the life" film, provided a thorough founda-
tion is demonstrated.
198. Photographic evidence is more frequently employed in criminal prosecutions. See,
e.g., Bunch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423, 436, 304 S.E.2d 271, 278 (1983); Whitley v. Com-
monwealth, 223 Va. 66, 75, 28(6 S.E.2d 162, 167 (1982); Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va.
513, 531, 273 S.E.2d 36, 48 (1980); Martin v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 436, 447, 271 S.E.2d
123, 130 (1980); Evans v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 609, 614, 212 S.E.2d 268, 272 (1975);
Timmons v. Commonwealth, 204 Va. 205, 214, 129 S.E.2d 697, 703 (1963); Newberry v.
Commonwealth, 191 Va. 445, 455, 61 S.E.2d 318, 323 (1950). Although the existing case
authority is dominated by criminal prosecutions, the same evidentiary restraints apply re-
gardless of the nature of the underlying suit. It would seem reasonable to be more strict in
criminal cases where the defendant's personal liberty is at stake than in civil cases.
199. 212 Va. 745, 187 S.E.2d 189 (1972).
200. Id. at 746, 187 S.E.2d at 190 (the court stated that it had traditionally "admitted
photographs in the first category by holding that a photograph which is verified by the
testimony of a witness as fairly representing what that witness has observed is admissible in
evidence ...."). See also 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 785 (1967).
201. See, e.g., State v. Goins, 120 W. Va. 605, 199 S.E. 873 (1938).
202. In Ferguson, the prosecution sought to admit a "Regiscope" photograph allegedly
depicting the defendant in the act of forgery, but was unable to produce a verifying witness
who could attest to the accuracy of the scene depicted by the photograph. Therefore, the
Ferguson court held that the photograph could not be admitted under the "illustration of
testimony" theory. 212 Va. at 746, 187 S.E.2d at 190.
203. Id.
204. Id. ("Given an adequate foundation assuring the accuracy of the process producing
it, the photographs should then be received as a so-called silent witness or as a witness
which 'speaks for itself.' ") (quoting 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §
790, at 219-20 (J. Chadbourn ed. 1970)); see also 29 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 200, § 785, at
857; C. FRIEND, supra note 78, § 170, at 382.
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toward the use of visual aids at trial."'
Although photographs admitted for either of these purposes
must be balanced against the potential for prejudice, it appears
that the Virginia Supreme Court is relatively broad-minded about
the contents of photographic evidence. Although photographs can-
not be used to inflame the jury,20 6 graphic displays of reality are
admissible. In Smith v. Commonwealth, °7 the prosecution offered
photographs of the body of the victim in a brutal stabbing. The
Smith court admitted the photographs because they "gave a more
accurate description of the location, nature and appearance of the
wounds than a mere verbal description."208 Thus, when bodily in-
juries must be described through graphic medical testimony, the
Virginia Supreme Court appears ready to admit photographs that
provide corroboration and amplification of that testimony.20 9 By
analogy, a properly authenticated "day in the life" film should also
be admissible in Virginia to illustrate medical testimony.
The Virginia Supreme Court is similarly broad-minded about
the contents of photographs that are offered as direct evidence of a
material issue. In Brown v. Commonwealth,10 the defendant was
charged with the murder of a four-year-old-boy. The prosecution
offered photographs graphically depicting the brutality of the
crime."' The Brown court held that the photographs were "admis-
205. The Ferguson decision indicates that the Virginia Supreme Court has recognized
that visual aids will continue to assume a more prominent evidentiary position in the court-
room. In expanding the purposes for which photographs could be used, the court noted the
advancements in visual technology and recognized a photograph's utility as an evidentiary
tool. 212 Va. at 746, 187 S.E.2d at 190. This enlightened perspective seems to imply that the
Virginia Supreme Court would not be inherently suspicious about "day in the life" films.
This perspective further indicates that, if the proponent carefully lays the foundation and
scrutinizes the film's content, the court would likely admit the film into evidence.
206. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
207. 207 Va. 459, 150 S.E.2d 545 (1966).
208. Id. at 465, 150 S.E.2d at 549.
209. Id. See also Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 468, 248 S.E.2d 135, 143 (1978)
("We are of the opinion that the photographs depicting contusions about the victim's neck,
abrasions on her back, and multiple stab wounds in her body were relevant and material
.. . and that they were no more inflammatory than the medical testimony detailing the
results of the autopsy.") (emphasis added); Westry v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 508, 513, 144
S.E.2d 427, 431 (1965). The Virginia Supreme Court has imposed a relatively high standard
which must be met before photographs will be excluded as inflammatory. See Coleman v.
Commonwealth, 226 Va. 29, 48, 307 S.E.2d 864, 874 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1617
(1984) ("to be inadmissible, the photographs had to be so inflammatory that they would
tend to induce a guilty verdict, regardless of the other evidence in the case.").
210. 212 Va. 515, 184 S.E.2d 786 (1971), modified, 408 U.S. 940 (1972).
211. Id. at 519, 184 S.E.2d at 788.
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sible to show the degree of atrociousness of the crime, or the mal-
ice with which it was committed." '212 Analogously, a "day in the
life" film is also admissible in order to prove the "atrociousness" of
the plaintiff's injury. s
A third analogy supporting the admissibility of these films is the
recognized acceptance of videotapes prepared by the prosecution
in criminal trials.2"4 In Stamper v. Commonwealth,"5 the defen-
dant was charged with a capital murder committed during the rob-
bery of a restaurant. The prosecution offered a videotape and
sound recording produced at the scene of the crime following arri-
val of the police. 216 The defendant objected to the film's introduc-
tion as inflammatory and unduly prejudicial.21 7 Although the
Stamper court conceded that the videotape depicted a scene of
"indescribable violence, 218 the court upheld its admission in reli-
ance upon the rule, promulgated in a number of jurisdictions, 1 9
that films are generally admissible in criminal trials. The court be-
lieved that the videotape's probative value in depicting the events
that occurred in the restaurant outweighed any potential
prejudice.220
212. Id. at 519, 184 S.E.2d at 789. The Virginia Supreme Court has reached this same
conclusion in a number of cases. See, e.g., Peterson v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 289, 294, 302
S.E.2d 520, 523-24 (1983); Whitley v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 66, 74-75, 286 S.E.2d 162, 167
(1982); Clanton v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 41, 52, 286 S.E.2d 172, 178 (1982); Westry v.
Commonwealth, 206 Va. 508, 513, 144 S.E.2d 427, 430-31 (1965); Timmons v. Common-
wealth, 204 Va. 205, 214, 129 S.E.2d 697, 703 (1963).
213. Brown may also provide the proponent of a "day in the life" film with a rebuttal to
the defendant's contention that the evidence is cumulative. See supra notes 78-93 and ac-
companying text. In Brown, the defendant contended that the photographs were cumulative
of medical testimony already presented. 212 Va. at 518, 184 S.E.2d at 788. In rejecting this
claim the court held that the photographs were not cumulative, but rather served to illus-
trate the medical testimony. Id. at 519, 184 S.E.2d at 789.
214. For a comprehensive examination of the admissibility of a viodeotape in a criminal
prosecution, see Annot., 60 A.L.R.3d 333 (1974).
215. 220 Va. 260, 257 S.E.2d 808 (1979).
216. Id. at 270, 257 S.E.2d at 816.
217. Id. (the defendant contended that since he stipulated as to the position of the vic-
tims and did not object to a diagram of the restaurant, the videotape constituted cumulative
evidence).
218. Id.
219. Id. See People v. Mines, 132 Ill. App. 2d 628, 270 N.E.2d 265 (1971); State v. John-
son, 18 N.C. App. 606, 197 S.E.2d 592 (1973); Williams v. State, 461 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Crim.
1970).
220. Stamper, 220 Va. at 270, 257 S.E.2d at 217 (the trial judge has the same degree of
discretion in admitting videotapes as he does in admitting photographs). Stamper, there-
fore, represents Virginia authority that a videotape is not necessarily cumulative of similar
evidence which was previously introduced. See supra note 217.
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More importantly, the Stamper court held that the admissibility
of videotapes is governed by the same evidentiary principles that
control the admission of photographs.221 This holding provides two
arguments supporting the admission of a "day in the life" film.
First, the proponent could argue that since videotapes prepared
exclusively by one party are admissible in criminal trials, they
should likewise be admissible in civil trials. Second, the proponent
could cite Stamper for the proposition that if the particular "day
in the life" film satisfies Virginia's admissibility requirements for
photographs, it should be admitted.
A final analogy upon which the proponent may rely in seeking
admission of a "day in the life" film is Virginia's Uniform Audio-
Visual Deposition Act of 1983.222 This Act provides for the taking
of depositions through audiovisual technology, without a steno-
graphic record.223 Particularly noteworthy are the procedural safe-
guards provided by the Act. These safeguards, in many respects,
mirror the procedural hurdles for the introduction of a "day in the
life" film. The Act requires that advance notice be given to the
opponent before the deposition is taken.224 It also requires that
complete background information be provided, including the tape
operator's name, the date of the deposition, and the names of the
parties and witnesses. 225 These procedures are similar to the foun-
dation which must be laid before a film can be admitted into evi-
dence.226 Finally, the Act provides that the complete deposition
must be preserved, even when only an edited version will be
used.227 In similar fashion, a proponent of a "day in the life" film is
usually required to preserve the entire footage, including edits, so
that the opponent may view it prior to trial.22s If the proponent
can assure the court that precautions have been taken similar to
those required by the Act, then a strong analogy exists supporting
the admissibility of "day in the life" films.
221. Stamper, 220 Va. at 271, 257 S.E.2d at 816; see also People v. Heading, 39 Mich.
App. 126, 197 N.W.2d 325 (1972); State v. Lusk, 452 S.W.2d 819 (Mo. 1970); Lampley v.
Waygood, 57 Tenn. App. 610, 422 S.W.2d 708 (1967).
222. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-412.2 to -412.7 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
223. Id. § 8.01-412.2.
224. Id. § 8.01-412.3, which reads, "[tlhe notice for taking a audio-visual deposition and
the subpoena for attendance at that deposition shall state that the deposition will be re-
corded by audio-visual means."
225. Id. § 8.01-412.4.
226. See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
227. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-412.4 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
228. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
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VII. CONCLUSION
As a general proposition, "day in the life" films are admissible
evidence. Admissibility, however, will always turn on whether the
proponent has provided an adequate foundation. The film must be
relevant to a material issue in the case, and must be thoroughly
authenticated to guarantee the accuracy of its contents. If these
foundation requirements are satisfied, the majority of courts will
admit the film into evidence.
Various procedural safeguards are required, or strongly sug-
gested, in order to assure admissibility. The proponent should al-
ways provide the opponent and the court an opportunity to view
the entire film prior to trial. This procedure might take the form of
a motion for a preliminary hearing in order to promptly determine
admissibility. Even so, admission is far from certain as the defen-
dant has a barrage of powerful evidentiary objections at his dispo-
sal. Furthermore, some courts, like the courts in Haley229 and
Thomas, 3° may exclude these films because of an alleged inappro-
priateness in general, without relying on a specific objection. In or-
der to minimize the possibility of exclusion, the proponent is ad-
vised to take the initiative by bifurcating the trial.
Despite the absence of direct Virginia authority, several analo-
gies exist that provide the Virginia practitioner with support for
admissibility. The Virginia Supreme Court has previously admit-
ted a wide range of visual aids, provided that the evidence is accu-
rate and relevant. The court has demonstrated its broad-minded-
ness both with respect to the contents of photographic evidence
and the purpose for which it is admitted. Particularly significant is
Stamper,23 ' which admitted a videotape in a criminal case, and
held that the same evidentiary rules govern the admissibility of
photographs and videotapes. In light of these analogies, admission
of a "day in the life" film in a civil suit does not constitute a
marked departure from established Virginia procedures.
229. Haley v. Byers Transp. Co., 414 S.W.2d 777 (Mo. 1967).
230. Thomas v. C.G. Tate Constr. Co., 465 F. Supp. 566 (D.S.C. 1979).
231. Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 257 S.E.2d 808 (1979).
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